LOCAL_USER_ID=0 passed every check and reached `setpriv --reuid=0`: the bot would run root while looking properly configured, and useradd -o accepted the duplicate uid without complaint. A non-numeric value failed later inside useradd behind `|| true`, which hid the real cause. The entrypoint now rejects both up front with a message naming the variable, and the id/uid expansions are quoted so a value with spaces cannot word-split into extra useradd arguments (audit SEC-007).
Verified by sourcing the entrypoint under a faked `id`: uid 0, 'abc' and '12 3' each exit 1 with the refusal line, while a non-root caller passes straight through to exec. AGENTS and .env.example state the constraint.
- Replace the mtime-touch stub-rebuild hack with cargo clean -p (a
future-dated host file could silently ship the stub binary)
- Optional FFMPEG_SHA256 build arg verified before extraction
- Drop the redundant libssl3/libcrypto copies and the root
supplementary group; strip the release binary; add a webhook-mode
healthcheck to the compose example
docker compose restart reuses the container, so the overlay fs keeps the
user created on first boot; a second useradd fails with exit code 9 and
set -e kills the container on every restart (crash loop, bot never comes
back). Create the user only if missing, align UID otherwise, and never
let chown failure on bind-mounted volumes kill the container.
Also comment out nginx-proxy's empty environment block in the compose
example: an empty mapping fails validation on newer compose versions
(must be a mapping).
YoursFunny